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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael J. Breinholt appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon
his guilty pleas to four counts of selling unregistered securities.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Breinholt and his father pooled their money to purchase a promissory note
for $128,000 from Annuit Coeptis, an entity run by Gabriel Joseph. (R., p.286.)
The note promised a high monthly interest rate.

(Id.) While Breinholt saw no

financial statements from Annuit Coeptis, he understood that Joseph was
working with Founder's Capital, a real estate investment entity run by Rich
Koerber. (Id.)
Breinholt then formed Streamline Financial and began selling promissory
notes of his own.

(R., pp.286-287; PSI, p.2.)

The notes promised investors

returns of 18% to 30% annually. (R., pp.286-287.) Breinholt initially sold these
notes to family and members of his church, and then through Silverstate
Mortgage, a local company. (R., p.287.) In all, Breinholt collected approximately
$3.5 million from at least 22 investors.

(R., p.287; PSI, p.2.)

Breinholt

represented to the investors that the investments were "safe" and backed by real
property and other hard assets, but did not provide information relating to the
financial condition or operating results of Streamline Financial, which never itself
purchased or owned any real estate. (R., pp.287-288; PSI, p.2.)

Breinholt sent

much of the investment money he collected to Annuit Coeptis and North
American Capitol Trust, the latter a company formed by the individuals who
1

operated the local Silverstate Mortgage office. (R., pp.287-288.)
For a time, Breinholt received interest payments from Annuit and North
American Capitol Trust, and made interest payments to those who had invested
in his Streamline Financial entity. (R., pp.287-288; see generally PSI, pp.31-47,
91-145) However, Breinholt stopped receiving payments from Annuit in August
2007, and from North American Capitol Trust in October 2007.

(R., p.289.)

Breinholt continued to collect new funds from investors until December 2007, but
stopped making payments to his own investors the same month. (R., p.290.)
The Idaho Department of Finance sued Breinholt and his companies.
(PSI, pp.48-60.)

Breinholt admitted committing fraud under the Uniform

Securities Act, I.C. § 30-14-501, and agreed to an entry of a judgment against
him for $5 million, which included provisions for restitution payments to his
victims. (PSI, pp.48-60.)
After the resolution of the civil case, a grand jury indicted Breinholt on
eight counts of securities fraud, seven counts of selling unregistered securities,
two counts of grand theft, and six sentencing enhancements for knowingly
accepting money representing equity in a person's home in connection with
committing securities fraud. (R., pp.13-29.)
Breinholt initially represented himself in the criminal case. (See R., pp.3738, 45-47.) At a scheduled status conference, Breinholt, who the district court
observed was draped in "a flag of some sort," stood, but refused to come into the
courtroom well. (R., pp.50-57.) Breinholt stated that he was the "beneficiary of a
trust" and requested that the court recognize his "sovereign status." (Id.)
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After

Breinholt continued to refuse court orders to come forward, the district court held
Breinholt in contempt and ordered that he serve three days in jail.

(Id.) The

court also appointed the public defender to represent Breinholt, and ordered that
Breinholt undergo an I.C. § 18-211 competency evaluation. (R., pp.58-60, 104105.)

Breinholt then secured private counsel to represent him.

(R., p.116.)

Breinholt's evaluation indicated that he was competent to proceed, and both
parties and the court accepted this conclusion. (See R., pp.126-127.)
Breinholt's private counsel then moved to withdraw after communications
between he and Breinholt broke down, and after Breinholt delivered a letter to
counsel unequivocally firing him.

(R., pp.154-161, 163.)

The district court

granted the motion and appointed the public defender's office to represent
Breinholt as stand-by counsel. (R., pp.179-180, 182-186.)
Breinholt then made several prose filings, including a "Motion in Limine to
Dismiss Criminal Complaint."

(R., pp.218-219, 261-273.)

In this motion,

Breinholt asserted that the criminal charges against him should be dismissed
because Boise and Ada County law enforcement officers lacked jurisdiction to
arrest him, because The Hon. Patrick Owen should have recused himself from
the case, and because his Fifth Amendment rights were violated. (R., pp.261267.) However, at the subsequent hearing on both parties' outstanding pretrial
motions, the state and Breinholt informed the court 1 that they had reached a
resolution and that Breinholt wished to plead guilty. (Tr., p.1, L.6 - p.6, L.13.)

1

Due to a scheduling conflict, a substitute judge presided over the change of
plea hearing.
(Tr., p.1, Ls.3-21.) Judge Owen returned to preside over
Breinholt's sentencing hearing. (R., pp.304-306; Tr., p.37, L.3 - p.87, L.7.)
3

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Breinholt entered Alford 2 pleas to four counts of
selling unregistered securities, and the state dismissed the remaining charges.
(Tr., p.1, L.3. - p.27, L.22; PSI, pp.28-30.)
Breinholt secured new private counsel to represent him at the sentencing
hearing. (R., pp.283-284.) The district court withheld judgment, placed Breinholt
on probation for 20 years, and imposed 180 days jail with credit for 53 days
served as a condition of probation. (R., pp.307-314.) The court further ordered
that Breinholt pay $240,000 in restitution.

(Id.)

Finally, the court placed

Breinholt on probation for 20 years, and imposed probation terms designed to
maximize the likelihood that Breinholt would meet his restitution obligations. (Id.)
Specifically, Breinholt was ordered to: maintain steady employment or be actively
seeking employment, establish a budget with his probation officer and verify
income and expenses, and not have any credit cards or incur any new
indebtedness unless specifically approved by his probation o'fficer.
Breinholt timely appealed. (R., pp.315-319.)

2

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
4

(Id.)

ISSUE
Breinholt's brief does not contain a statement of issues on appeal as
required by I.A.R. 35(a)(4). By its order dated June 21, 2012, the Idaho Supreme
Court granted Breinholt's "Motion to File Non-Conforming Brief on Appeal" and
accepted Breinholt's Appellant's brief as filed. (6/12/12 Order.) Throughout his
brief, Breinholt asserts that district court judge Patrick Owen should have
recused himself from Breinholt's criminal case because he had previously
presided over Breinholt's civil case. (See generally, Appellant's brief.)
The state phrases the issues on appeal as:
Has Breinholt failed to show that the trial court judge erred in failing to
recuse himself from Breinholt's case?

5

ARGUMENT
Breinholt Has Failed To Show That The Trial Court Judge Erred In Failing To
Recuse Himself From Breinholt's Case
A.

Introduction
Breinholt contends that the trial court judge presiding over his criminal

case erred by failing to recuse himself.

generally. Appellant's brief.) It is

unclear whether Breinholt contends that the district court erred in not construing
his motion to dismiss as a motion to disqualify the trial court judge, or whether he
asserts that the trial court judge should have affirmatively recused himself.

In

either instance, Breinholt's claims fail.
Breinholt cannot show that the district court erred in not construing his
motion to dismiss as a motion to disqualify because his motion to dismiss did not
satisfy the requirements of a motion to disqualify a judge for cause pursuant to
1.C.R. 25(c).

Further, even if the district court erred in failing to rule on

Breinholt's attempted disqualification motion, any such error was both invited and
harmless. Finally, Breinholt failed to preserve any claim that the trial court judge
should have affirmatively recused himself, and in any event, Breinholt has
asserted no actual bias or other grounds for disqualification.

B.

The District Court Did Not Err In Declining To Construe Breinholt's Motion
To Dismiss As A Motion To Disqualify The Trial Court Judge
Idaho Criminal Rule 25(b)(4) allows for the disqualification of a judge who

is "biased or prejudiced for or against any party or that party's case in the action."
Disposition of a motion to disqualify is within the sound discretion of the trial
court. State v. Elliott, 126 Idaho 323, 329, 882 P.2d 978, 984 (Ct App. 1994).
6

Idaho Criminal Rule 25(c) requires a motion to disqualify for cause be
"accompanied by an affidavit of the party or that party's attorney stating distinctly
the grounds upon which disqualification is based and the facts relied upon in
support of the motion."

Such a motion need be granted only where there is

actual prejudice against the litigant of such a nature as to render it improbable
that the presiding judge could or would give the litigant a fair and impartial trial.
Cook v. State, 144 Idaho 482, 492, 180 P.3d 521, 531 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing
Elliott, 126 Idaho at 329, 882 P.2d at 984).

When a party files a motion for

disqualification pursuant to I.C.R. 25, the presiding judge lacks authority to act
further in the proceedings until it grants or denies the motion. I.C.R. 25(e).
Breinholt never brought an I.C.R. 25 motion to disqualify the trial court
judge for cause in this case, and he therefore cannot show that the district court
erred in declining to rule on any such motion before accepting Breinholt's guilty
plea or sentencing him. While Breinholt asserted that the trial court judge should
have recused I·1imself as one of his proposed grounds for dismissal in his "Motion
in Limine to Dismiss Criminal Complaint," that motion did not constitute an I.C.R.
25 motion to disqualify for several reasons. First, Breinholt's motion did not cite
I.C.R. 25.

Second, nowhere in the motion did Breinholt request that the trial

court judge be disqualified from the case; Breinholt instead simply moved for
dismissal of the criminal charges. Third, the motion was not accompanied by an
affidavit stating the grounds for disqualification, as required by I.C.R. 25(c).
Finally, at the change of plea hearing, despite the district court's attempts to have
Breinholt clarify the purpose of his motion, Breinholt never asserted that he

7

wished to disqualify the trial court judge for cause.

(See Tr., p.1, L.3 - p.36,

L.11.) In fact, to the contrary, when the district court inquired about the issue,
Breinholt responded, "I had an objection to the rescheduling order was really
what [the motion to dismiss] was. I did want [Judge Owen] to stay on the case so
that we could go through the trial with him. That's something that I would have to
research to see if I did want to have Judge Owen." (Tr., p.32, L.25 - p.33, L.5.)
The district court informed Breinholt that if he wished to file a motion to disqualify
Judge Owen for cause, he could still do so prior to sentencing, and Breinholt
indicated he would consider doing so. 3 (Tr., p.32, L.9- p.36, L.10.) The content
of Breinholt's motion to dismiss and the actions and statements of Breinholt and
the district court demonstrate that the motion did not constitute an I.C.R. 25
motion to disqualify Judge Owen. The district court thus did not err in declining
to rule on any such motion.
Further, even if the district court erred in declining to rule on Breinholt's
attempted motion to disqualify, Breinholt is precluded from challenging any error
by the doctrine of invited error. A party is estopped, under the doctrine of invited
error, from complaining that a ruling or action of the trial court that the party
invited, consented to, or acquiesced in was error. State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho
389, 402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. App. 2000). The purpose of the invited error
doctrine is to prevent a party who "caused or played an important role in
3

Even if Breinholt made an I.C.R. 25 motion to disqualify Judge Owen, the
substitute judge handling the change of plea hearing would have had authority to
accept Breinholt's guilty pleas prior to any ruling on the motion to disqualify.
I.C.R. 25(e) precludes only the "presiding judge" of a case (i.e., the judge subject
to the disqualification motion), from taking any action prior to ruling on an I.C.R.
25 motion to disqualify for cause.
8

prompting a trial court" to take a particular action from "later challenging that
decision on appeal." State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 120
(1999). Moreover, the failure to raise an issue before the trial court waives that
issue for the purposes of appeal. State v. Lenon, 143 Idaho 415, 416-418, 146
P .3d 681, 683-84 (Ct. App. 2006).
In this case, Breinholt clearly acquiesced in any district court error not to
rule on his attempted disqualification of Judge Owen.

During the scheduled

hearing on his "Motion in Limine to Dismiss Criminal Complaint" and other pretrial
motions, Breinholt both informed the court that he wished to enter guilty pleas to
some of the charges, and, as discussed above, assured the court that he wished
for Judge Owen to continue presiding over the case. (Tr., p.1, L.3 - p.36, L.11.)
At no time during the hearing did Breinholt request that the court rule on either
his motion to dismiss, or on any motion to disqualify Judge Owen.

Because

Breinholt clearly acquiesced in any district court error not to rule on any
attempted motion to disqualify Judge Owen, Breinholt invited such error and is
precluded from challenging this issue on appeal. 4
Finally, any district court error is harmless. "Any error, defect, irregularity
or variance which does not affect substantial rights should be disregarded."
I.C.R. 52. As discussed below, Breinholt asserted no actual bias that would have
required Judge Owen to disqualify himself from the case pursuant to l.C.R.

4

Similarly, this Court could find that Breinholt waived this issue by abandoning
his motion to dismiss. See Lenon, 143 Idaho at 416-418, 146 P.3d at 683-684
(holding that by raising and then abandoning a motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
Lenon "purposefully limited the thoroughness of the record on appeal" and that
the Court would "not reward this tactic").
9

25(d)(4).

Because Breinholt's meritless motion would not have led to

disqualification of Judge Owen, the court's failure to rule on his motion did not
affect his substantial rights. The district court's failure to rule on Breinholt's
motion, even if error, is thus harmless.
To the extent this Court construes Breinholt's appeal as alleging that the
district court erred

in declining

to

rule on

any attempted

motion

for

disqualification, this claim fails. Breinholt never filed a proper I.C.R. 25 motion to
disqualify Judge Owen for cause.

Even if the district court should have

construed Breinholt's motion as a motion to disqualify, any error in not ruling on it
was invited by Breinholt and was harmless. This Court should therefore affirm
Breinholt's convictions.

C.

The Trial Court Judge Did Not Err In Failing To Affirmatively Recuse
Himself
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal."
Carlson, 134 Idaho at 398, 3 P.3d at 76. Absent a timely objection, the appellate
courts of this state will only review an alleged error under the fundamental error
doctrine. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588, 261 P.3d 853, 865 (2011); State
v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P .3d 961, 979 (2010) (re-articulating the Idaho
fundamental error standard for claims raised for the first time on appeal).

In

order to establish fundamental error, under Perry, an appellant must demonstrate
that the error he alleges: "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional
rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not
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contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure
to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless."

kl

at 228, 245

P.3d at 980.
Prior to Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a defendant's assertion,
made for the first time on appeal, that he was deprived of his constitutional right
to a fair trial because the trial court judge was biased against him could not
constitute fundamental error and could not be raised for the first time on appeal.
State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596-597, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308-1309 (1992);
State v. Knowlton, 123 Idaho 916, 918-919, 854 P.2d 259, 260-262 (1993).
However, in Knowlton, the Idaho Supreme Court distinguished that issue from
the issue Breinholt appears to raise in this case - whether a trial court judge errs
in not affirmatively disqualifying himself from a case.

kl at 919-920,

854 P.2d at

262-263. Without referencing fundamental error, the Idaho Supreme Court cited
the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct and considered the merits of Knowlton's
claim that the trial court judge should have affirmatively disqualified himself.

kl

The Court held that the judge's service on the Governor's Task Force for
Children at Risk did not necessitate recusal from Knowlton's case.

kl

Thus, the

Idaho Supreme Court appeared to imply that a judge's failure to affirmatively
disqualify himself for bias could constitute fundamental error reviewable for the
first time on appeal.
In this case, however, Breinholt has failed to show any error, let alone the
"plain error" required by the second prong of the Perry fundamental error test.
On appeal, Breinholt has not asserted that Judge Owen was actually biased

11

against him except to state that "it was obvious to anyone that Judge Owen's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned due to him being the judge in the civil
case." (Appellant's brief, p.4.) However, the fact that Judge Owen previously
presided over Breinholfs civil case did not, by itself, establish bias, and did not,
by itself, require Judge Owen to affirmatively disqualify himself from Breinholt's
criminal case.
While a trial court judge is subject to recusal from a case if he previously
served as counsel for any party in the proceeding, I.C.R. 25(b)(3); Idaho Code of
Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E)(1 ), the Idaho appellate courts have consistently
held that judges are not required to recuse themselves when they have
previously presided over related proceedings involving the same parties.
Specifically, the Idaho appellate courts have held that trial court judges are not
required to recuse themselves where: the trial court judge continued to preside
over a criminal case on remand after an appellate court held that the trial court
judge had erred, State v. Jones, 146 Idaho 297, 298-300, 193 P.3d 457, 458-460
(Ct. App. 2008); the trial court judge presided over a defendant's post-conviction
proceeding after previously presiding over the defendant's sentencing hearing in
the underlying criminal case, State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 107, 967 P.2d 702,
721 (Ct. App. 1998); the trial judge entertained an I.C.R. 35 motion where it had
previously imposed the sentence being challenged, State v. Beam, 115 Idaho
208, 214-215, 766 P.2d 678, 685-686 (1998); see also State v. Zamora, 129
Idaho 817,818,933 P.2d 106, 107 (1997) (holding that the trial court judge was
not required to recuse himself where he had been the prosecuting attorney in

12

one of the cases alleged as the basis for a persistent violator charge in the new
case); State v. Gri'ffith, 144 Idaho 356, 361, 161 P.3d 675, 680 (Ct. App. 2007)
(holding that trial court judge who expressed a belief in defendant's guilt at a pretrial conference was not required to recuse himself where he was not the trier of
fact on the issue of the defendant's guilt, and where defendant did not show that
court's opinion unfairly infected the court's rulings).
As the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Beam, "[a] trial judge is not required
to erase from his mind all that has gone before, and indeed, it is doubtful that any
human being could."

~

at 215, 766 P.2d at 685. Additionally, "[t]hat judges are

capable of disregarding that which should be disregarded is a well accepted
precept in our judicial system." Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 205, 731 P.2d
192, 200 (1986) (quoting Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 811 (11 th Cir. 1983)).
It is actual bias or prejudice, not mere participation in a previous or related case,
or even an opinion about a defendant's guilt, which necessitates judicial recusal.
Similarly, Breinholt has established no per se grounds for qualification based on
Judge Owen having previously presided over Breinholt's civil case.
To the extent this Court construes Breinholt's appeal as attempting to
assert, for the first time on appeal, that the trial court judge should have
affirmatively recused himself for bias, Breinholt has failed to show error, let alone
fundamental error that would require reversal. Therefore, this Court should affirm
Breinholt's conviction.

13

CONCLUSION
The

state

respectfully

requests

that this Court affirm

Breinholt's

convictions and sentences for four counts of selling unregistered securities.
DATED this 13th day of September 2012
MARK W. OLSON ~
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13th day of September 2012, I caused
two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be
placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
MICHAEL BREINHOLT
1976 Star Ln
Meridian, Idaho 83646

Mark W. Olson
Deputy Attorney General
MWO/pm
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